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SOME GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE GADSDEN
TREATY*

By FREDERIC A.

COFFEY

,lIttlemajority
of our
United States histories have
T
to say concermng the Gadsden Treaty. One concise reference reads:
'
~E

~eneral

The net result of, the efforts at expa~sion
southward was an acquisition of minor importance. In 1853 James Gadsden, representing the
U. S., purchased from Mexico at a cost of $10,000,000, a strip of land lying to the south of the
Gila River. By this act a boundary dispute was
settled with Mexico, and the U. S. acquired a ,tract
of land, which, according to surveys of the War
Department, was needful for the building of a
'transcontinental railroad along a southern route.
Thus Schlesinger succinctly tells the story.' In the light of
the panorama of ~vents coming full and fast from 1846 on
for over a decade, it is not strange that the historians have,
passed the treaty up, to emphasize the things which for
longer periods held the attention of the nation.
'
Future standard works of history are not as apt to
ignore entirely the Gadsden Treaty as Channing and, Bassett have done., There are. several reasons why the Gadsden Treaty deserves greater emphasis at the hands of, our
general historians.
• Paper 'read at the Southwestern Division, A.A.A.S., State College, N. Mex.;
May 2, 1933.
1. Schlesinger, Politic<d and Social HistoTjJ of the United States, 1829·1925, pp.
139·140.
.
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From an engineering viewpoint the "Gadsden" railroad
route is still accepted as the most satisfactory transcontinental route. While the central route today outranks it in
point of freight tonnage, the difference is surprisingly little
considering the northern destinations of a large portion of
the goods carried in the east-west transcontinental traffic.
Second, from a highway viewpoint it remains literally the
Broadway of America;. The whys and the wherefores of the
territorial acquisition through which it passes is becoming
a matter of increasing interest to the American tourist.
Third, it deserves a place in the historians' more or
less exhaustive story of the westward movement. FollowIng the lead of Von Holst and especially Rhodes, our hIstorians have considered that the only things to record after
the Mexican War were those everttsof a sectional nature
which reflected some aspect 01 slavery or involved questions
of constitutional interpretation. It remained for Dr. Frederick J. Turner to point out the significance of the American
frontier. Broadened, that meant essentially the influence
of the westward movement upon American history. Paxson, Alvord, and others have followed, while Garrison, Bolton, Webb, Barker, Marshall, etc., have restricted th~ir
studies more completely to the general Southwest. It is to
the southwestern phase of the movement that the Gadsden
negotiations and treaty belong.
Before the Mexican War our pioneers had penetrated
beyond the accepted territorial confines of the western
United States either as explorers, traders, or settlers into
Texas, New Mexico, California, and Oregon. The campaign
of 1844 served to crystallize American thinking on the prob..,
lem of the relations between the United States and at least
two 01 these areas, namely, Texas and Oregon. The "reoccupation" of Oregon or "54 0 40' or fight," and the "reannexation" of Texas were campaign slogans. Polk, having
advocated before the people both slogans, won the verdict
over Clay and Birney. The story of Polk's success in car. rying out our "Manifest Destiny" then followed.
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With the Oregon issue settled in June, 1846, the energies of the government were more directly focused upon
our problems with Mexico. Then it was that the Polk ad·
ministration aggressively or otherwise caused the- United
States to engage in a conflict with Mexico: This paper is
not concerned with the causes of the Mexican War except in
so far as they shed light on the treaty of 1853. It engages'
in enough controversial points.
As a matter of fact our relations with Mexico involving the desire of the United States for territory go back to
much earlier dates. As early as March, 1827, Adams' secretary of state, Henry Clay, negotiated through Joel Poinsett for a revision of the Treaty of 1819 line and the purchase of Texas." It is definitely established that overtures
were made by the Jackson administration to purchase Texas
and an additional strip of territory extending westward to
, the PaCific and including the Bay of San Francisco.''' No
progress whatsoever was made under Poinsett and the negotiations came to naught as Justin H. Smith tells us in
his monumental work, The War with Mexico', with the
recall of that swashbuckling politician, Anthony Butler.
Again, in 1845, John Slidell was sent to Mexico with the in-structions _to take up the claims of Am'erican citizens
against Mexico, the settlement of the boundary in the upper
stretches of the Rio Grande, and the purchase of California.
Polk was mild, however, in his reference to California
as he instructed Slidell to negotiate for its purchase only if
the endangering of the ;restoration of friendly relations
with Mexico could be avoided.
Two things stand out in these early negotiations so
far as the place of the Gadsden Purchase in the westward
movement is concerned. First, the desire for southwestern
territory preceded the slavery controversy as a marked
2.
3.
4.

Latane, A HiatOT1l of the American Foreign Policy,
Rippy, The United States ami Meorieo, p. 7.
Vol. I, pp. 62-63.

p. 239.
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national issue. This means that while slavery' is involved
in the territorial acquisitions of the southwest the picture is
much clearer when the territorial gains from Mexico are
conceived to be fragmentary to the whole westward move,.
ment. The reader is invited to investigate Frederic L. Paxson's viewpoint, as found in his work, The History of the
American Frontier.' Then, the ,negotiations indicate a
rather ambitious "manifest destiny." One will recall. that
Polk authorized Slidell to acquire California and New Mexico. The amount of territory desired would naturally increase following a victorious war. So it is not strange that
when Trist presented a smaller acquisition than the admin- '
istration desired a later Democratic administration worked
for more territory.
,
This aspect of the background of the treaty of 1853-54
deserves more detailed treatment., The Mexican War was
fought with California becoming independent and passing
rather immediately under American control, Kearny being
successful in his conquest of the Southwest, and Taylor
winning a presi(lential nomination' at Buena Vista, and
Scott storming the heights of Chapultepec to force a treaty
of peace.
,The peace treaty signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo on February 2, 1848, ,was negotiated on the American side by
Nicholas P. Trist., Rippy in his The United States and
Mexico comments:
'
And by this time the unprecedented conduct
of the American commissioner had provoked Polk
into authorizing his recall. Tiist refused to take
notice of a small matter like this, however, and
proceeded to negotiate a treaty in accordance with
the instructions which he had received almost a
year ,before ... It was reluctantly received by an
embarrassed administration and soon accepted by
the government of both countries."
Rippy's comment on Trist simply points to the accepted
conclusion among American history students that the
6.

P. 14.
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treaty did not secure the' amount, of territory which the
Administration had expected to receive from Mexico. Trist
was authorized "to acquire New Mexico and Upper California and, if possible, Lower California.''' For the" three
states he was to pay not more than $25,000,000, and for "the,
two not more than $20,000,000. Just what the boundary
should be in order to acquire these states varied. Should he
be successful in securing New Mexico and both Alta and
Baja California the boundarY'line should run as follows:
Commence in the Gulf' of Mexico, three
leagues from the land opposite the mouth of the
Rio Grande; from thence up the, middle of that
river to the point where it strikes the southern
line of New Mexico; thence westwardly'along the
southern boundary of New Mexico to the southwestern corner of the same; thence northward
along the western line of New Mexico, until it intersects the first branch of' the river Gila; or if
it should not intersect any branch of that river,
then to the point on the said line nearest to such
branch; and thence in a direct line to the same,
and down the middle of said branch, and of the "
said river, until it empties into the Rib Colorado;
thence down the middle of the Colorado, and the
middle of the Gulf of California to the Pacific
oc~an"
'
All of the proposals originating either in Washington
or with Tdst included as much territory as was finally acquired in the treaty and in addition called for im outlet on
the Gulf of California~ Certainly Trist acquired a minimum
of territory while he may be said to have abided by his
rather out-of-date instructions.
EVIdently as the war progressed there grew a greater
demand for territory among the Americans. There were
those who counciled the acquisition of, the entire' area of
Mexico. Less inclusive but sufficiently impressive were the
senate demands advanced by Senators Houston and Davis.
i

I

'7.
8.

Atlas 0/ Historical Geography. C. O. Paullin and' J. K. Wright, p. 64.
Ibid.
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Houston wanted to draw a line across from Tampico to
Lower California at a point on about the 25th parallel. Finally the boundary provision of the treaty of 1848 provided
for the Rio Grande as the boundary up to the southern
boundary of New Mexico. No specific parallels or meridians are mentioned in the treaty but the city of Paso is
referred to. The boundary west was as described above in
Trist's instructions of April 15, 1847. The question which
had to be worked out was what were the southern and
western boundaries of the Mexican State of New Mexico.
Therefore it was provided:
The southern and western limits of New
Mexico, mentioned in this article, are those laid
down in the map entitled "Map of the· United
Mexican States," as· organized arid defined
by various acts of the Congress of said republic,
and constructed according to the best authorities.
Revised edition. Published at New York, in 1847,
by J. Disturnell, of which map a copy is added to
this treaty, bearing the signatures and seals of
undersigned Plenipotentiaries."
The guide selection as to maps might have proven all right
except that Disturnell's map made some substantial errors.
EI Paso was located at about 32 0 15' north whereas it- is
located at 31 0 45' north. He further had EI Paso and consequently the adjacent are,as and surface features too far to
the east by about two degrees. Without involving ourselves
further in the details of the boundary dispute, suffice it to
say that it resulted in agitation for the United States to settle the boundary issue by purchasing the disputed area."
First it is noted that the "Purchase" is explained as a
phase of the westward movement. Second, the solution of
the southwestern boundary dispute was made through the
United States acquiring a newly defined boundary farther
to the south. Third, the purchase is.to be explained in terms
9. Ibid.
10. Dr. P. M. Baldwin in the April, 1930, issue of the Now Mexico HitItorical
Review has a very scholarly paper on "The Boundaries of New Mexico."

!I

~
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of other parts of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo as well as
the changing scene in the United' States itself.
There were other important provisions in the treaty
which had a bearing on the future Gadsden Treaty. Article
XI of the Trist treaty provided that the United States would
assume the "obligation of preventing Indian i~cursions into
Mexican territory and restoring Mexican citizens captured
by the Indians." The magnitude of the task assumed under
this article was not fully realized by the United States when
Buchanan as Polk's secretary of state asserted:"
That his government possessed "both the
ability and the will to restrain the Indians within
the extended limits of the United States from
making incursions· into Mexican territories as well
as to execute all the other stipulations of the
eleventh article."
.

,.

It seems that the United States made some considerable
effort to carry out this provision. James S. Calhoun was
made Indian agent for New Mexico in 1849. J. C. Hays
was sent among the Gila, Apaches. In all cases, however,
there seems to have been a notable lack of means and equip':'
ment with which to secure results. While troops were scattered along the southwestern frontier they were decidedly
too few in number to check materially the Indian depredations.
•
With the failure to prevent the Indian raids from one
side to the other the United States found claims being
accumulated against it. Constant. references were made to
the situation by the Mexican minister at Washington. Web-,
ster, who became Taylor's secretary of state in 1851, in~
structed Letcher, the American minister to Mexico, to secure a release from Article XI and the similar prov~sion of
the treaty of 1831. He .saw a mounting of the exagger-'
ated and fraudulent claims for indemnification."'"' A monetary consideration for the release of the United States from
11.
12.

P. N. Garber, The Gadsden Treaty, p. 27.
Rippy. U...ited States a'nd Memco, p. 83.
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the eleventh article was contemplated but the funds were
to be used in fulfilling Mexico's obligations under the claims
convention of 1843 which was unsatisfactory to that nation.
Negotiations moved slowly although pushed .by;
Letcher. Rising financial demands of the Mexican government came to exceed the minimum Letcher was prepared to
offer and so the negotiations came to a close. Alfred Conk':'.
ling succeeded Letcher as minister to Mexico but with con-.
tinued heavy demands. being made by the Mexican minister:
of foreign relations the :Q}atter stood as of the treaty of 1848
when Gadsden arrived in Mexico in 1853.
The treatment of the .Gadsden Treaty has been done'
by Paul Neff Garber. His is the most authoritative specialized study of the agreement.· One cannot refrain from
observing, however, that it is far from the last word in the'
matter and that his lack of scrutiny has prevented it from
being the monumental work that such a doctorate effort
should be. There is work' yet to be done. The Spanish
viewpoint is much better presented by Rippy in his incidental treatment. Dr. P. M. Baldwin has clarified much
more the boundary aspects of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. An exhaustive study inclusive of these and other
things is desirable.
It is from Garber, however, that we gather the story of
James Gadsden. Gadsden, which is spelled G-a-d-s-d-e-n,
was born in 1788 and so he was 65 years of age when he
became minister to Mexico in 1853. He came from an old
family of Charleston, South Carolina. Following his graduation from Yale in 1806, he became a merchant in Charleston. He then served with distinction in the War of 1812,
to continue his services afterward as an expert engineer and
aide-de-camp to General Jackson, who campaigned in the
Southwest against the Indians after .the War of 1812.
Gadsden struck up a very close friendship with General
Jackson, which was to be or.oken only by the acceptance by
Gadsden of the South Carolina position on the doctrine of
nullification. Through Jackson he was rapidly advanced
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in the army until the senate refused to affirm Monroe's appointment of him as adjutant general of the army. He
then became interested as a negotiator and as a settler in:
Florida,
By 1839 Gadsden was back in Charleston. His merchant connections served to arouse his interest in interior
contacts and in 1840 he became the president of the Louisville, Charleston, and Cincinnati railroad. In life one experience and one dream leads to another, and next Gadsden
became interested in furthering the "plan of a southern
railroad to the Pacific Ocean." The plan so crystallized in
Gadsden's mind that he had .charleston as the eastern ter-.
minus and South Carolina. on an intimate basis with the
west. At the Memphis convention in 1849 he was advocating a transcontinental road with a route along the Gila
river.
By 1853 Gadsden had become an ardent secessionist
but was not an.d had not beEm interested in the acquisition
of large territorial areas from Mexico except in so far as a
natural boundary between the areas could be effected. The
slave-holding aristocrats were not such ardent advocates of
large territorial gains from Mexico, but when the issue of
a transcontinental railroad arose they were ready to swing
its routing into the Southwest. .
Is it strange, therefore, that Jefferson Davis brought
his influence to bear upon President Franklin Pierce in the
selection of Gadsden as minister to Mexico? Gadsden had
common interests with Davis .and above all he was safe in
contrast to the defiant Trist of 1847-48.
With one exception the instructions to Gadsden indicate the nature of the problems discussed by him with the
Mexican representatives. He .was expected to ignore the
Garay-Tehuantepec Isthmus grants in the negotiations, but
to effect a solution of the Mesilla Valley boundary dispute.
This boundary problem involved the problem of a railroad route. The Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty in Article VI
had provided: 18
/
13.

Garber, p. 19.
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that if, in the future, a 'road, a canal, or railroad
should be constructed which should run along the
Gila River, within the radius of one marine league
of either the right or the left bank, the two countries were to form an agreement as to its construction.
Then as the boundary commission of Bartlett and
Conde swung into action and reports ,'were made in turn by
Bartlett, Gray, Whipple, and then Emory, the question as to
whether an adequate route had been secured by the Trist
treaty waf; raised. Bartlett thought a railroad could be built
along the Gila. Gray thought it would have to come well
below the Gila and Lieutenant Whipple declared that the
railroad would have to pass into Sonora to miss the Pinal
Llano mountaiils. Colonel Emory insisted that a practical
route, lay only to the south of the locations advocated by
Bartlett and Gray.,
Secretary of State Marcy was convinced that additional
territory south of the Gila was necessary for a railroad but
he could not be definite without a survey. Therefore he
expected Gadsden to secure sufficient territory for a prac,tical railroad route with compensation in a moderate
amount being granted Mexico.
Gadsden's further instructions had partially to do with'
the eleventh article of the treaty of 1848. As previously
suggested the time had come to seek a release from its
obligations.
Gadsden reached Vera Cruz in August, 1853, and on the
17th of that month held his first interview with Santa Anna.
He was destined to negotiate with Bonilla, minister of foreign relations, and later a commission composed of Bonilla
and two engineers.
It is unnecessary to follow the minute details of the '
negotiations as the conference and exchange of notes occurred. Little can be gained by such a cataloging. It is
well to note the trend of the negotiations and the position
of Gadsden after the arrival of instructions from Washington via Christopher L. Ward.

'\
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By October no progress had been made except that
Gadsden now understood,the situation much better. More
. and more he came to the conclusion that money would solve
the problem and that Santa Anna's government would soon
be sorely in need of it and might be overthrown. Gadsden's
communications to Secretary Marcy pictu!ed the opportunity as soon to come if only he were in a position to capitalize it. The impression he made upon Marcy was that the
issue was not the amount of territory to be ceded but the
amount of money to be passed. Marcy, accepting more or
less Gadsden's recommendations, proceeded to provide him
with further and detailed instructions.
Ward was therefore selected· "as a special secret messenger" and was sent to Mexico "to communicate verbal instructions to Gadsden for the negotiation to a treaty."'"
Ward's message from the department of state was con. cerned, according to the department's filed memorandum,
with six possible boundaries between the United States and
Mexico and the maximum sums whichrp.ight be paid for
any of the t~rritorial gains.
Boundary No.1 proposed through Ward was the choice
of President Pierce. . The line would have transferred "a
large portion of what was then the northern part of the
states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and all of Lower
California." .The line was based upon divides and mountain
barriers and was therefore considered to be of a permanent
nature. Gadsden was authorized to pay up to $50,000,000
for this line. The No. 2 proposed line did not go as far
south of the Rio Grande as No.1 nor did it include Lower
California. $35,000,000 was authorized for this line. Line
No.3 did not extend far below EI Paso but it included the
Peninsula .of Lower California for all of which $30,000,000
could be paid.
Line No.4· differed from line No.3 in that Lower California was excluded and only $20,000,000 was authorized
as a maximum payment.
14.

Garber, p. 90.
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. Line No; 5 got down to the minimum requirements of
the United States.. It provided for a line to be drawn from
the Rio Grande west along the parallel of 30°48' to the Gulf
of California. Release from all damage claims under the
treaty of 1848 and the abrogation of the eleventh article of
the said treaty were to be included as considerations should
Gadsden offer up to $15,000,000. The sixth line made a
fairly slight variation from the 5th by starting from the Rio
Grande at the 32nd parallel.'"
As the filed departmental memorandum shows, Ward's
instructions were concerned with the above matters. However, Ward from the beginning began to stress the desira-'
. bility of securing recognition of the claims now held by an
American company based upon the Garay-Tehuantepec
Isthmus grant. Another-grant had- been subsequently made
by the Mexican government known as the Sloo grant which
is to be associated with the Conkling convention. Doubting
that Ward was relaying the true desires of the president or
Secretary Marcy, Gadsden compelled Ward to put his message in writing which Ward reluctantly did; The sum total
result of the agitation for a recognition of the Garay grant
was to embarrass the negotiations and delay the solution of
the boundary problem.
Other things embarrassed the negotiations. It became
evident that Santa Anna's government relied heavily upon
the representations of Almonte, its representative at Washington, who reported the Americans as wanting a railroad
route so much that a heavy price might be exacted. Further linking up of claims,· the Garay grant, and the sum to
be paid for territorial gains complicated things. Then, too,
there is little doubt but that Gadsden himself embarrassed
things by his bluster and intimidation. Ward was not always the one saying what he should not say.
The Walker filibuster expedition into Lower California
came at exactly the wrong time for Gadsden. The situation
15.

Garber, The Go.dsden Treaty, pp. 91-93.

\
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in the Mesilla Valley was unsatisfactory as well. Governor
Lane of New Mexico had intimated that he would occupy
the disputed territory and break the status quo agreement
which Gadsden had made with Santa Anna toward the beginning of the· negotiations.
It was rather evident as negotiations continued that
Santa Anna was not interested in ceding any more territory
than could be avoided because he felt that it would mean
the overthrow of his government. While his need for money
was great,except for personal uses the money would mean
little should he be out of power..
It is' not surprising therefore that when negotiations
reached the point of preseriting a treaty draft as a basis for
discussion. it hinged around boundary No. 5,a line
calling for a minimum territorial gain. The treaty was
worked out in conference from Dec. 10 to Dec. 30, 1853, in
Mexico City. It was signed at the American legation building on the latter date. Theboundary·proposal which was
. accepted was suggested by Bonilla and accepted on Dec. 23.
.The remaining conferences were concerned with the problems of compensation a~d claim recognition.
In all the treaty had ten articles. Article I outlines a
new southwestern boundary as follows:
It began on the Rio Grande at latitude 31"
47' 30" N. passed thence by a right line to the intersection of the 31st parallel with the HUh meridian, thence by a right line to ,a point in the Colorado River two marine leagues north of the most
northern part of the Gulf of California, and thence
up the middle of that river to the boundary fixed
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo."·

Article XI of the Hidalgo Treaty was abrogated with
the United States promising to aid Mexico against the Indians. The United States assumed all claims of Americans
against Mexico (which was estimated at $15,000,000). A
. claims commission was organized. Navigation of the Colo16a. 'AtlG<r 0/ HisiwkaJ Geog'l'aphlf, C. O. PaUllin and J. K. Wright,

p.

66.
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rado, Gulf of California, and Brazos rivers by Americans
was not to be interrupted.
Certain parts of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were .
reaffirmed. Mexican land grants in the ceded territory
were recognized. A "promise of mutual co-operation to
suppress filibustering expeditions" was made.
Space precludes a treatment of Gadsden's attitude and
whether he thought he accomplished much. The latter c~m .
be explained by what he said to the custom official who interrogated him at New Orleans. . "Sir, I am General Gadsden. There is nothing in my trunk but my treaty."
, Christopher Ward, however, was the treaty bearer to
the president. He delivered the inter-country agreement to
the president on January 19, 1854. The interesting thing
was that the public, through the columns of the New York
World, "knew" about the treaty sooner than Washington
and knew its contents only one day later than Washington.
At least this early scoop indiCated possibilities of intrigue
and under-cover pressure which Gadsden charged impaired
his efforts all during the period of negotiation.
The president and his cabinet proceeded to holdup the
treaty for almost daily discussion until February 10. As
Polk had found himself in a dilemma over Trist's treaty;
Pierce found reasons for disapproving this agreement as
well as accepting it. Naturally he was surprised to .find
any recognition of the Garay grant so the recommendation
to amend article III, was, made to the senate providing for
the omission of any recognition of this claim. Two other
recommendations were made to the senate. While Article
XI of the Guadalupe Hidalgo pact was abrogated by Article
II of this treaty the United States was still obliged to restrain the. Indians along the internationai line. Pierce
thought this obligation should be recognized as being
mutual. Pierce's third suggestion was that the agreement
in Article VIII concerning "the method by which the United
States should co-operate in the suppression of filibuster
raids"'· :was too specific in its stipulations and therefore
16.

Rippy, Unit<>d Stat"" and MtnJioo, p. 148.
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should be made much more general. Pierce was willing to
pass the treaty on for the senate confirmation with these
changes even though he still had a somewhat divided cabinet over the matter.
The senate· as a body, due to other business, rather
ignored the treaty from Feb. 10 to March 13. The committee on foreign relations reported the treaty out on March 9.
The committee report was substantially as Pierce recommended except that the committee personnel did not feel so
antagonistIc to the Garay claim.
A detailed discussion of the senate treatment of the
document will give us little additional light. The nature of
the alignments that developed and the ultimate changes as
the treaty was finally formed are more important. Rippy
has classified the senate lines of cleavage into five groups.
There were the anti-slavery irreconcilables who naturally
opposed the territorial gain which might add to the domain
of the slave-holders.. A few, led by Senator Mason of Virginia, were ready to accept the treaty as Gadsden .had
signed it at Mexico City. Another bloc favored the treaty
as it was signed, except to recognize the Sloo-Tehauntepec
claim as opposed to the Garay claim. A fourth group
agreed with Senator Rusk that only enough territory to
provide "a feasible railway route"" should be acquired. The
fifth group, led by California's Gwin and Weller, demanded more territory and a part on the Gulf· of Lower
California. They went so far as to advocate a mountain
and desert boundary line so as to have a natu~al defensive
barrier between the countries. Certainly with such cleavages the original treaty was bound to undergo some compro...:
mise changes before it would be presented to Presid~nt
Pierce for his formal approval or rejection.
Of the ten articles of the treaty as Gadsden had signed
it, five remained virtually intact. The ten became nine with
the other five revised into four" articles. Articles I and III
17.
;"

Ibid.
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as they were changed are of most interest to the student of
southwestern history.
Perhaps one might reasonably expect that the United
States would desire as much continuous continental territory as it could peaceably acquire. Especially would this
seem the case when the American frontier was far from
being closed, but as the final treaty shows here was an exception. Actually the United. States acquired much less
territory than it would have acquired had Article I of Gadsden's Treaty been left as it was presented to the senate.
Rippy has labored through the documents of the period to
discover that six or seven amendments were offered to Article I. Of the groups that were not satisfied, the general
group wishing for more territory felt the need for a port on
the Gulf of California and a "route better adapted to a Pacific railroad."18 Those opposed naturally moved to minimize
the acquisition. Shields, Gwin, Rusk, and Mason offered
one or more amendments each calling for a redefined boundary. Shield's amendment was the most ambitious, .providingfor the 31st parallel line between the Colorado River and
Gulf of· California and the Rio Grande. Shields and Gwin's
amendments both were defeated. Rusk, who offered a more
moderate amendment, had his passed. It provided for a
line leaving the Rio Grande at the parallel 31° 47'; continuing due westward for 150 miles; "thence south 30 miles,
and then by a right line to the Rio Colorado or the Gulf of
Mexico, as the case might be; and thence, as in the other
proposals, to the Pacific.'''"
Rusk then· asked for a reconsideration of the line as,
in present day. southwestern New Mexico, there probably
was need for more land for a railroad route than would be
available by extending a line 150 miles due west from the
Rio Grande at 31° 47'. The apparent solution was to compromise the area by extending the 31°47' line only 100 miles
west of the Rio Grande and then to turn south; and relin18.
19.

Ibid., p. 160.
Ibid., p. 161.
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quish some of the western area south of the Gila by defining the line further to the north even though it meant the
loss of land connections with the Gulf of Mexico. Again.
Rusk's amendment was accepted. This virtually established
the line as it came to be, the difference being that 100 miles
west of the Rio Grande the southern extension was 30 miles
instead of the 31 0 20' definition as finally established.
It was during the latter phases of the senate's con'sideration of the treaty that Mason offered the resolution
which actually was confirmed. The line was defined, as"
beginning at the intersection of the parallel of 31 0
and,47' with the Rio Grande; thence due west one
hundred miles; thence south to the parallel of 31 0
20' ; thence along the said parallel" .. t() the 111th
meridian of longitude west of Greenwich; thence
in a straight line to a point on the Colorado River
twenty English miles below the junction of the
Gila and the Colorado Rivers; thence up the middle of the said Colorado until it intersects the present line between the United States and Mexico.
How did it happen that the United States relinquished
territory as a result of its own ratification proceedings in
which Mexico was willing to acquiesce?21 The transcontinental railroad and slave issues were the chief issues which.
forced a compromise from the purchase advocates. While
there were other considerations as noted above relative to
the senatorial cleavages these two things forced compromises.
By April 6, 1854, it was evident that the treaty would
have to be revised as only two more votes were needed at
that time to table the treaty.
20. Ibid, p. 152.
21. A comparison of the treaty drafts as signed by Gadsden
both Mexico and the United States will show clearly enough that
would have gained more territory for the United States than was
Garber's Gadsden Treaty, opposite p. 92, and the Historical Atlas,
vincing enough. Garber says (p. 131) "The territory acquired by
was reduced nine tho~sand square miles by the senate." This
from the U. S. and Mexican claims commission report of 1868.

and as ratified by
the Gadsden draft
secured. Maps in
plate 94b, are con-· .
the original treaty
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162 THE NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
Mason then retired as the leader for confirmation to be
replaced by Rusk. Rusk became aggressive in his
efforts to secure the necessary two-thirds vote. He
sensed the necessity of satisfying the various elements in opposition so he set about rather systematically to appeal to them. The chief appeal to most
of the northern senators, if they could be brought to support any purchase at all, was to minimize the area to be
secured. CorisequentlyRusk introduced the amendment to
materially reduce the area of the purchase on April 10.
Probably feeling the need for further alteration, Rusk secured acceptance of a second boundary amendment. This
amendment clearly indicated that the territory was for a
railroad route and not for commercial ~ins in the Gulf of
California region. Mason's amendment, putting the boundary line into its final form, did not apparently have value
as a compromise feature.
Article'II as finally set up merely called for the abrogation of Article XI of the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty and
the 33rd article of the treaty of 183!.
Article III as Gadsden had submitted it called for too
much compensation and an undesirable recognition of ,the
Garay claim. The figures were reduced until the ainount
stood at $10,000,000. The original $20,000,000. provision
was to be divided by remitting $15,000,000 to Mexico and
$5,000,000 in turn to the American claimants upon Mexico
including the specifically mentioned Garay claimants. Although Gadsden and Mason had been sold on the desirability
of the Garay claims the senate refused to consider the private claims.
In the later stages of the senate discussion Rusk saw
the need for support from the few senators who backed the
Sloo-Tehuantepec grant. Senator Bell's amendment with
six essential provisions regarding the isthmus was rejected. However, the outcome was that Bell's amendment
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in substance, .but without express, designation of the· SIOQ,
company as claimants, was adopted."
On April 17 the treaty was· reported out of the committee of the whole to the senate. The vote for ratification
showed a lack of three votes in order to have the necessary,
two-thirds majority." The press engaged in a pro and con
discussion of the matter which served at least to keep the'
treaty before the public. It was after the Southern and
Western Commercial Convention at Charleston from April
8,..15 that the confirmation· finally came. Feeling the pulse of.
the South the southern senators Jones, Dawson, et cetera,
returned to the sessions with a. determination to push
through the treaty..The senate confirmation came on April
25, 1854, with a vote of 33 to 12.
Three things remained to be done before· the treaty
would become effective: 1st, the president must give a final
acceptance or rejection; congress, ~nd, must vote the necessary appropriation; and 3rd, the Mexican government
must ratify. Pierce hesitated to reject the muchly mutilated treaty. He probably wondered when another, the
least bit advantageous, could be negotiated. It was after
the Mexican government had agreed to ratify the treaty
that Pierce came to accept. the document.
The. Mexican side of the whole picture is a story in
itself and must be reserved for another treatise. Suffice.
to note that with the reduction in payment Santa Anna felt
more inclined to heed the suggestions of the British. The
British, however, through Doyle, their minister to Mexico,
did not give encouragement to any idea of British concessions for a treaty rejection. Therefore with reluctance
Santa Anna agreed to ratification.
Pierce asked for the necessary appropriation from
the house of representatives on June 21, 1854. The ways,
22. Rippy, United States and Meo:ico, PP. 153-64.. The Art. VIII of the ratified treaty was considered to he a partial victory for the 8100 claimants. It is to he . .
B8S0Ciated with the original Articles III and IV.
.
23. Garber, Gadsden TretltJ/, p. 126.
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and means committee, headed by Houston, duly reported
out an appropriation bill of the desired amount.'"
It was then that the house, resolving itself into a committee of the whole, received its opportunity to reopen the
controversial aspects of the treaty. Jones of Tenn., Benton,
Bayly, and Jones of Penn., Haven, Phillips, Keitt, Smith,
Giddings, Wa~hburn, Boyce,' Peckham, Perkins, and others
spoke in the house but the most emphatic of them all was
Benton, who was an ardent supporter of the central transcontinental route. Again sectionalism was a factor but
the national feeling of the need for a satisfactory railroad
route plus the domination of the democrats, perhaps, turned
the tide in favor of the appropriation with a vote 'of 105
to 63.'"
The place of the treaty in the American historical perspective, again, seems to be that it is a part of the westward
movement. It was the last acquisition in the Southwest but
it was not the last effort to secure territory." The difference fundamentally seems to be that there was a demand
for more territory, not for settlement but for a railroad
route, whereas the additional territory desired later could
not be justified as a part of the needs of the west. While
American penetration could even yet result in agitation
for additional territory it would have to be a large area to
and beyond the southwestern deserts if any substantial
American territorial needs could be satisfied.

State College, New Mexico.
24. Ibid., p. 13!.
25. Garber, Tlu Gadsden Treaty, Pp. 144-145.
26. In 1857, Secretary of State Lewis Caes instructed Forsyth, American
minister to Mexico, to offer Mexico $12,000,000 for a new line running from the
middle of the Rio Grande on the 30th parallel thence due west to the nearest tribntary of the Rio Chico or the Rio Hiaqui. Failing to secure any consideration of
the offer, Cass, through McLane, the new minister, made an overture in 1859. This
offer was for Lower California, the right to a transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepee, and other privileges. With the sectional issue becoming more aggravated as
the election of 1860 was approaching it is a matter of conjecture as to whether a
treaty would have been ratified, if passed.

